讲座题目：Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation

报告人：宋阳波

报告时间：2021年4月30日14：00

报告地点：经管院B249

主办单位：350vip8888新葡的京集团数理经济与数理金融系

主持人：Daehyun Kim

内容摘要：We study adversarial information design in a regime-change context. A continuum of agents simultaneously choose whether to attack the current regime. The attack succeeds if and only if the mass of attackers outweighs the regime's strength. A designer manipulates information about the regime's strength to maintain the status quo. Our optimal information structure exhibits local obfuscation: some agents receive a signal matching the regime's true strength, and others receive an elevated signal professing slightly higher strength. This policy is the unique limit of finite-signal problems. Public signals are strictly suboptimal, and in some cases where public signals become futile, local obfuscation guarantees the collapse of agents' coordination.

主讲人简介：宋阳波，本科毕业于香港大学经济金融系，于加州大学洛杉矶分校获得经济学博士学位，现于香港中文大学（深圳）经管学院任助理教授。研究方向为博弈论、网络经济学和信息经济学，论文见于Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization等国际知名期刊。目前主要研究内容包括超模博弈中的信息设计，网络中的信息不对称与合约设计，意识局限对策略行为的影响等。